Om inte det svenska biståndet läggs ned, som Sverigedemokraterna vill, kan Sverige kraftfullt medverka till den avgörande möjligheten att få stopp på heroinfloden till Europa och de kriminella gängen med anledning av utvecklingen i Afghanistan. Det är den legendariska chefen för FN:s narkotikabekämpning Pino Arlacchi, som föreslår att hela världen skall hjälpa talibanerna med deras föresats att utrota opiumodlingen i Afghanistan. Det var under Arlacchis ledning som FN förhandlade fram ett avtal med den tidigare talibanregeringen att förbjuda och helt avveckla opiumodlingen. Det var flera år av direkta förhandlingar med talibanska ledarna som ledde till det framgångsrika genomförande av programmet 1998-2000. Opiumodlingen hade så gott som helt upphört sommaren år 2001.
Sociologiprofessor Pino Arlacchi kunde genomföra avvecklingen av opiumodlingen i Afghanistan när han var chef för UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) åren 1997-2001. Han har även varit rapportör för Europaparlamentets utredning i samma fråga. Nu är han hyperaktiv med att sprida sitt förslag att detta FN-samarbete med Afghanistan, som främst stöddes av de Nordiska länderna, Italien och Tyskland, skall återupptas.
Pino Arlacchi deltog i Schillerinstitutets webinarium i Köpenhamn måndagen den 11 oktober för att samla internationellt bistånd till avvecklingen av opiumodlingen i Afghanistan. Medverkade gjorde också H.E. Ahmad Farooq, Pakistans ambassadör i Köpenhamn och Schillerinstitutets Sydvästasienkoordinator Hussein Askary för att berätta om grannländernas fredsplan att ekonomiskt lyfta Afghanistan och hela regionen genom det internationella samarbetet BeltandRoad med mycket stora infrastrukturprojekt för att återskapa landets plats på Sidenvägen.
Här följer först en sammanfattning på svenska av de breda åtgärderna som Sverige behöver göra i Afghanistan i narkotika-, bistånds- och näringspolitik. Efteråt följer på engelska en dokumentation av insamlade uttalanden av framför allt Pino Arlacchi, som har gjort uttalanden i många tidningar internationellt den senaste tiden. Han deltog i Schillerinstitutets konferens den 31.7 och igen på uppföljningskonferensen den 21.8 och hans tal från Köpenhamnswebinariet går också att höra nu (1).
Lägg om svenska biståndet istället för att dra ned!
Anders Fänge från Svenska Afghanistankommittén pekade i SvD Debatt den 28.8 på viktiga argument för att det ifrågasatta svenska biståndet till Afghanistan inte skall minskas (2). Det är avgörande för stabiliseringen av landet att inte bara skolor och sjukvård skötta av utländska hjälporganisationer hålls igång, utan även den mycket större andelen skolor som sköts av staten, skriver han. Likaså att matsituationen stabiliseras, eftersom 95 procent av befolkningen nu har brist på mat. Det kommer särskilt drabba kvinnor och barn om inte maten kommer fram innan vintern stänger bergspassen. Redan nu dör barn av svält och en miljon barn riskerar akut att svälta ihjäl i vinter. Om något av svenska biståndsanslaget till Afghanistan dras ned till några av landets andra myndigheter, går det att flytta anslagen till skolor, hälsovård och coronavaccin, men också till den nu möjliga avvecklingen av opiumodlingen, som är av global strategisk betydelse för kampen mot terrorism och gängkriminalitet. I motsats till vad Sverigedemokraterna tror, är bekämpningen av de kriminella gängen i våra förorter en fråga där bistånd för att få slut på narkotikaodlingar är viktigt.
Välkomna Afghanistans avveckling av opiumodling!
Afghanistan stod under år 2020 för 84% av världens opium- och därmed heroinproduktion, enligt FN:s World Drug Report, och föder mycket av den internationella terrorismen och våra förorters alltmer våldsamma gängkriminalitet. Svenska Afghanistankommittén rapporterar dessutom att ”Opiatmissbruk var tidigare ovanligt i Afghanistan, men de senaste årtiondena har antalet opium- och heroinmissbrukare ökat kraftigt.” Efter talibanernas tillkännagivanden att de vill förbjuda opiumproduktionen har de också börjat samla ihop missbrukarna från sina miserabla tillhåll under Kabuls broar för avgiftning.
För Sverige som länge har haft en framträdande roll i det internationella arbetet mot narkotika, vore det naturligt att med de frigjorda biståndsmedlen omedelbart öka stödet till UNODC och de andra FN-organisationer som skulle kunna ta tag i denna möjlighet. I projektet ingår att lokalt stötta avvecklingen av opiumodlingen i Afghanistan. De opiumodlande bönderna behöver bygga upp en självförsörjning baserad på alternativa grödor och narkotikamissbrukarna behöver rehabiliteras och komma in i produktivt arbete. Svenska regeringen skulle omedelbart kunna uppmana Sidas partnerorganisationer att undersöka sina möjligheter att snabbt omfatta sådana verksamheter i Afghanistan och ansöka om de biståndsmedel som kan frigöras från visst tidigare bistånd till myndigheter som nu tagits över av den talibanledda regeringen.
I en debattartikel i SvD den 6.8 skrev utrikesminister Linde och biståndsminister Olsson Fridh att Sverige satsar på att fortsätta med ett omfattande bistånd direkt till Afghanistans folk och pekar särskilt på att ”Covidpandemin och torkan pressar den afghanska befolkningen”. Frågan om att lösa problemen med årets stora torka ligger helt i linje med att stötta omställningen av opiumodlingen med vattenprojekt, tillsammans med utrustning och infrastruktur för elektrifiering, fiberanslutningar, transporter och annat som behövs för ett fungerande jordbruk och tillgång till marknader.
Den fortsatta rehabiliteringen av Afghanistans narkomaner är en fråga som kommer att kräva stora utbildningsinsatser, men precis som med det angelägna stödet till flickors utbildning, kommer det att bli ett slag i luften om det inte finns jobb efter utbildningen. Risken finns då att missbrukarna återfaller och kvinnorna tvingas bli sittande i hemmen trots sin utbildning. Det gör att ministrarnas uttalande om stöd mot Covidpandemin, liksom stöd till den nu i brist på löner, medicin, drivmedel och elektricitet till 90 procent nedstängda afghanska hälsovården, är dubbelt angelägen.
Stöd till en stor satsning på vaccinering mot Covid-19 och grundläggande hälsovård skulle medverka till att begränsa pandemin lokalt och globalt, men också kunna ge kvinnor och rehabiliterade narkomaner ett första jobb inom vården för tjänstgöra som lokala vaccininformatörer i byarna och allteftersom mer kvalificerade uppgifter. Här finns också möjlighet för samarbete med utländska hälsovårdsinstitutioner och unga volontärer som Schillerinstitutets “Kommitté för motsatsernas sammanfallande” föreslagit.
Avbryt den finansiella blockaden mot Afghanistan
Avgörande för landets stabilisering och alla afghaners framtida möjligheter är att ekonomin i stort börjar fungera och breda grupper kommer igång med produktivt arbete. Den ensidiga fokuseringen på talibanerna gör att Västvärlden nu brutalt saboterar Afghanistans nationella institutioner som sjukhus, skolor, elsystem, vägverk, vattenverk, polisväsende osv. Det görs genom en förödande finansiell blockad just när landet ekonomi behöver komma igång. Detta trots att det är samma sjukhus, läkare, personal – t.o.m. samma hälsovårdsminister – och samma andra nödvändiga myndigheter som när Västvärlden tidigare gav massivt bistånd. Valutareserver som förvaras i USA har lagts i beslag så att afghanska staten inte kan betala ut löner och för mat, medicin, elektricitet, bränsle osv. Inte ens utländska betalningar av insamlat stöd till hjälporganisationer i Afghanistan tillåts under Västvärldens bankblockad. Detta har gjort att det inte finns pengar för inköp och att cirkulationen av sedlar nästan avstannat för den dagliga konsumtionen från affärer. Priserna skenar och nästan hela folket har kastats ut i svält.
Det är 7 miljarder dollar av den afghanska nationens valutareserv på 9,5 miljarder dollar, som nu hålls kvar i Federal Reserve på order den 15 augusti av USA:s av finansminister Janet Yellen. Samma totala likgiltighet inför de svältande afghanska barnens situation uppvisar den internationella Valutafonden som den 23 augusti stoppade en redan beslutad utbetalning av ett lån på 370 miljoner dollar som skulle gjorts tillgänglig för den afghanska nationens centralbank i form av speciella dragningsrätter. Även de pengarna som var ett särskilt krislån i samband med den internationella ekonomiska krisen, skulle direkt kunnat användas för nationen Afghanistans omedelbara behov. Resten av valutareserven med undantag av 0,1-0.2 procent undanhålls av andra internationella finansinstitutioner. Sabotaget av landets betalningssystem riskerar att göra den ekonomiska misären för befolkningen så stor att landet destabiliseras, krig åter bryter ut och landet fortsätter vara den geopolitiska oroshärd som den varit sedan 1800-talet för att blockera kommunikationen mellan Centralasien och Indien. Risken är mycket stor att en stor del av de 38 miljonerna afghanerna ser tvingade att fly och en ny flyktingkatastrof skapas.
Sedan den 19 januari 2021 är finansminister Magdalena Andersson en av Valutafondens högsta makthavare. Som ordförande för Internationella monetära och finansiella kommittén (IMFC), Internationella valutafondens högsta rådgivande organ behöver hon förklara vilket ställningstagande Sverige har tagit till Valutafondens iskalla beslut att blockera de medel som Afghanistan som nation behöver för att lindra krisen i landet där hundratusentals barn och kvinnor riskerar att dö i vinter i brist på mat och förlossningsvård. Smiter inte Sverige från vårt ansvar att bygga freden efter att tillsammans med USA ha ägnat 20 år åt ett orättfärdigt krig? (3)
Delta i grannländernas fredsplan
Alla grannländerna samlas nu runt en fredsplan för Afghanistan baserad på Kinas BeltandRoad. Det handlar om att bygga järnvägar och vägar som kan bli utvecklingskorridorer både inne i landet och genom landet som genom krigen gjorts till en geopolitisk mur som delat Centralasien från Sydasien och hamnarna i Indiska oceanen. Även USA deltog i juli i diskussionen att bygga en utvecklingskorridor genom landet. Vägar och järnvägar har redan byggts in i afghanska gränsstäder från alla grannländer. (4) Avsikten är landet skall sluta vara en barriär mellan Sydasien och norra Asien utan bli en brygga för samarbete. En sådan fred i kan bli en motsvarighet till Berlinmurens fall och slutet för tiden med eviga krig sedan Great Game. Det växer därför fram ett tydligt alternativ till mer krig, terrorism, narkotika, flyktingvågor, mänsklig misär och gigantiska kostnader. Det finns därför en möjlighet att rycka igång landets ekonomi så att landets många ungdomar inklusive tidigare missbrukare kan bygga en framtid för sig, sina familjer och hela landet.
Ett beslut togs i februari i Uzbekistan om den stora genomkorsande järnvägskorridoren från Uzbekistan genom Khyberpasset till Pakistan. Sverige har anledning att i Europeiska banken för återuppbyggnad och utveckling, Asiatiska infrastrukturinvesteringsbanken och andra utvecklingsbanker, där vi är medlemmar, stöda ansökningarna från detta viktiga projekt och främja svenska företags deltagande i den stora uppbyggnaden av Afghanistans ekonomi. I det långa kriget har Sverige har byggt upp en stor kunskapsreserv om hur det är att arbeta i regionen och knutit många högt specialiserade kontakter. Vi har en stor grupp flyktingar därifrån. Sammantaget har detta långsiktigt knutit ihop våra länder, vilket gör att svenska företag har en stor chans att delta i den stora uppbyggnaden av landet men också i grannländernas snabba ekonomiska tillväxt.
De många människoliv och miljarder kr som har gått till spillo i det missriktade kriget, måste ges en mening genom att det afghanska folket får en chans att bygga en framtid. Av många skäl är det därför mycket angeläget att regering och riksdag tar till vara dessa möjligheter för att hjälpa Afghanistan i sin svåra kris och samtidigt oss själva, ända ut i de av narkotikagängen härjade utanförskapsområdena, och fullt ut använder hela det redan beslutade svenska biståndet till Afghanistan.
(1) Talet av Pino Arlacchi från Schillerinstitutets Afghanistanwebinarium i Köpenhamn den 11.10 2021 går att höra från 43 minuter 22 sekunder på ljudfilen: https://schillerinstitut.dk/si/2021/10/afghanistan-seminar-invitation-afghanistan-hvad-nu-fred-gennem-oekonomisk-udvikling-mandag-den-11-oktober-2021-kl-13-16-i-koebenhavn/ Hela webinariet kommer att publiceras som video och i utskrift så snart det kunnat färdigställas på https://schillerinstitut.dk/si
(2) https://www.svd.se/recept-pa-katastrof-att-frysa-bistandet
(3) https://schillerinstitutet.se/slapp-strupgreppet-om-afghanska-folkets-valutareserver/
(4) Se föredrag av Hussein Askary, Sydvästasienkoordinator för Internationella Schillerinstitutet om “BeltandRoad och den framtid som Afghanistan söker”: https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2021/eirv48n29-20210723/eirv48n29-20210723_afghanistan-offprint.pdf
Documentation in English of the statements by professor Pino Arlacchis at the Schiller Institute conference July 31 in a dialogue with Claudio Celani and on the Schiller Institute followup conference August 14. After that follows slugs with links to international media showing the efforts by professor Arlacchi to present in many nations his proposal to immediately restart the international support for the erradication of opium in Afghanistan.
CLAUDIO CELANI, Schiller Institute: Good morning, we are here with Pino Arlacchi who is a legend in the fight against international crime. He has been Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, and in charge of the international fight against narcotics. He has continued his mission as a member of the Italian Parliament, and of the European Parliament, where he was the rapporteur on Afghanistan. And he has also advised many governments in the world.
So, we are here today, good morning, Pino. You have written a book, which I started to read. It’s in Italian. It’s called Against Fear [Contro la paura: La violenza diminuisce. I veri pericoli che minacciano la pace mondiale], and in this book you touch on several issues. One that concerns us today is Afghanistan. But we will go over many other points, if we may.
Let me start with saying that most of our audience probably does not know that when you were at the UN you succeeded in eradicating almost the entire opium production in Afghanistan. Is that true? Can you tell us about it?
PROFESSOR PINO ARLACCHI: Yes, it was the Taliban who did it, under our control and our pressure. When I started our mandate, I immediately went to Afghanistan and I tried to negotiate with them the elimination of a narcotic crop in the country—at the time, they controlled basically almost the whole country—in exchange for a long-term program of alternative development for the Afghan farmers. My proposal was a 10-year program. They proposed to do it in one year, and in exchange for all of the money of the development plan. They gave it to them immediately.
Then we started the long partner negotiations, in which there were different moments. At a certain point, I got tired of their behavior, because initially they accepted the formal prohibition of narcotics production, or poppy production, in the country. Then they started to balk a bit, and so on. So at this point, I asked the Security Council to do some of the further sanctions, and we started to pressure them more seriously. We had basically a good relationship with them. They were much more reasonable than they were described in the press.
After intense work with them, helping them with one hand, and pressuring them on the other, we got to this result. In the summer of 2001, there was almost zero production of opium in the country, because they decided to enforce the ban that they’d previously done under our advice. Unfortunately, the same year, in October, the United States invaded Afghanistan, after September 2001. And the first thing they did was, instead of continuing enforcing our work and our plan, and extending the agreement to the Taliban on alternative development, they decided to go in a different way.
Mr. Rumsfeld, who was at the time the Secretary of Defense, did the personal negotiation, not to the Taliban, but warlords that they were supporting, the U.S.A. was supporting them, and the content of the negotiation was that the United States would not care about narcotics production, in exchange of the support of the warlords for the so-called war on terrorism, not realizing that the same person was supporting terrorism where they wanted to fight it.
So, our plan disappeared, and in just two years, the production of opium poppy in Afghanistan skyrocketed to a huge level and continued with a different moment, until today.
Q: How effective was your plan that you implemented with the Taliban government?
ARLACCHI: The first move of the plan was to enact a formal prohibition of opium poppy, because they were playing a bit with words in the Koran, we involved some expert, an Islamic theologist, who pronounced the clear verdict against poppy production.
Then we basically wrote the prohibition ban, and then we started to pressure them on the implementation, using some funds that we had to help with the implementation, first in a small area just to test their ability, in Kandahar and surroundings. This test worked not badly. And then we continued to do this, and we did the same work with their enemies—with the group of militias, aided by the great commander of the Northern Alliance. So, with our surprise, also—because we did not think they would ever implement, all over the country, our plan—they did it!
So, this was the premise. If there would have been sufficient international aid, which was not too big a figure, at the time we were talking about a very, quite small figure—my initial plan was priced at $100 million, in five years, for the elimination of opium poppy: $20 million a year. If there was even a small engagement of the international community in implementing the development plan, my project, there would not have been any opium production in Afghanistan. The market would simply disappear.
And this happened, partially, the same year with Europe, which was the main client of opium poppy—90% of opium poppy, of the heroin production, narcotic production of Afghanistan goes to Europe. There was an effect on prices and so on, which was, in part vanished by deposits that they created, the traffickers created, on the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. There were almost 100 tons of narcotics hidden in deposits on the border. But we discovered that also, through our cooperation with the Russian space agency. We did a very precise map of these deposits of narcotics that were scattered, mostly in Tajikistan. And I also involved the Security Council in the authorization of an action against these deposits, action that was not allowed by the firm opposition of, first, the British government.
But the overall lesson is that it is possible to eliminate opium production. This is not really very expensive. And now—we’re talking about 20 years ago—and now the situation is exactly like it was 20 years ago. The Americans now have been obliged to negotiate and make an agreement with the Taliban. The Taliban control again most of Afghanistan, and opium poppy production is a bit more than it was at the time.
Q: So how do you see the situation today to implement again your plan, or have you improved the plan? Is the situation better, or worse, than when you started it?
ARLACCHI: The situation is basically the same, internally, the Taliban control, again, most of Afghanistan. Internationally, maybe, it is a bit more favorable. There are more players involved. Twenty years ago, the role and the weight of China was quite negligible. Now, China is a major player in the area. The weight of the United States has been drastically reduced by the withdrawal of troops, and by the basic failure of the Afghanistan invasion. There are other players, like Russians, and also the other actors in the area, the countries that border Afghanistan, that are making plans on the future of Afghanistan.
With the Russians, I tried to enact, or to implement this plan, after my work in the European Union, my work in the European Parliament; the Russians had been fully cooperative. I had developed, along with Viktor Ivanov, who was, at that time the drug czar of Russia, a plan, the implementation of the plan. The Russians had agreed to implement it and to fund it, even if they were not enthusiastic about alternative development. But I convinced them it was the case. They wanted just an agreement with the EU to implement the plan together. But the EU simply did not care about it. Ivanov came to Brussels; we spoke with the EU Commission, the Parliament, and so on. In the Parliament there was a basically positive attitude, but the Commission simply didn’t care about this proposal that could have been effective.
Q: You know, you mentioned China, and in this panel, we will have a gentleman who will talk about the perspective of integrating Afghanistan, the Afghanistan economy, and the development of Afghanistan in the Belt and Road Initiative of China. This is also the idea of the Schiller Institute. How do you see this?
ARLACCHI: I fully support it. I’m sure that since the Chinese New Silk Road Plan is serious. It’s been implemented now for a number of years. And since the development philosophy of the plan is strong, I believe that there are many more chances of success now, than when I was there. The issue is to be enough focussed on it, not to dilute this plan into the overall big figure plan for Afghanistan. This is the main point, the main condition of this success.
Q: Well, to be focussed, it could mean to concentrate on one or two main development corridors, which means one or two major infrastructure systems for Afghanistan, so that the country is connected to its neighbors and to the world economy. You mentioned in your book The Belt and Road and the Positive Aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative, improving connectivity. Is that your concept?
ARLACCHI:Yes, because it’s not just connectivity. Infrastructure development means creating that base for development, that should be done in parallel with development plans. This is the reason why it should not be diluted. Better roads work well, can work very well in Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is a classic transit country for all trade between the East and West. But narcotics production is a very specific issue, that occurs in very specific areas. So, the Belt and Road is OK, but it should be accompanied by a very precisely focussed development plan—elimination of narcotics, opium production, and so on, in the area where this production occurs. It means particularly the area of Kandahar and central-south Afghanistan.
Q: How much would it cost for a modern version of your plan for Afghanistan?
ARLACCHI: I estimate that it would not be much more than it was. If is to be effective, the issue is how much we prize this plan here, and how much of this investment arrives actually in the areas concerned? This is the main point. Because what I learned doing the plan with the EU strategy for Afghanistan, what I learned, studying both sides, how this money is, the development money for Afghanistan goes, and how it is implemented, and the effects of what they do.
What I learned is that most of this money—let’s say 80%—does not get to Afghanistan. That it does not get to what is the target. Most of this money is lost. Lost not simply on the huge corruption of the Afghan government. This is the usual story, it is true, that we tell and we learn all the time. But what is not said, and what people do not know—and I tried in my plan to put in the foresight—is that 80% of this money does not reach Afghanistan. The EU spends more or less €1 billion a year for development aid in Afghanistan; the United States, a bit more. But it’s not more than $200-$300 million that gets really into construction of schools, roads, facilities, and so on. Then you have corruption of the Afghanistan government, which is, let’s say, not more than 40% or 50% of this figure. So, the real money that arrives there is very small. So, any implementation of this plan means an agency of implementation, a system of implementation responsible for that, that eliminates most of this counterindication.
Excerpt from presentation by Professor Pino Arlacchi at the Schiller Institute extra webcast August 21, 2021: https://youtu.be/5GXoPY3q3zk?t=3665
PROFESSOR PINO ARLACCHI: Yes, yes. I agree very much on the fact that we should not restrict our discussion to Talibanology. What are the real intentions, why we should trust them or not, is not very clever. I dealt with them 20 years ago. I don’t know if I said already my experience in the last webinar, but anyway, I had to do with the top leadership of the Taliban when I was at the UN, about the issue of narcotics elimination. And I found them quite reasonable interlocutors. And we’re talking about the Taliban of more than 20 years ago.
I had a meeting with the governor of Kandahar about the issue of reactivating a wool factory, which was donated by the German aid agency. This factory was good to give work to more than 2,000 people, men and women, and it was not active, so for a small investment of a couple of hundred thousand dollars, it could be reactivated. So the governor said yes, I have consult somebody else—it means the top leader, who was living there, in Kandahar. Then, he got the OK, came, and we discussed the issue of women. He said, yes, but we have some issues about women working in the factory. Our answer was, “No way. Women must work. If you don’t allow women to work, say goodbye to our investment.” He asked again for some time to consult Mullah Omar, and then came back: OK, women can work, but they should work in a different part of the factor. We said, yes. And then we started to activate the factory. Then the investment was stopped, because somebody else arrived, a foreign investor bought the factory. The foreign investor was somebody called bin Laden, who was living at the time in Kandahar, close to where we were in the meeting. I informed the Americans about everything, and so on, and this occurred in 1998, so they had all the elements about bin Laden.
Anyway, I want just to say, about the Taliban, I don’t know these Taliban, and it would be really stupid to elaborate their thought, and so on. They made a statement: now they have a government, and we will see. We should talk—every government should talk with them, because everyone talks with them. The Americans have been talking to them for two years, and in Italy, for instance, at this moment, we have a very silly debate, “talking or not talking with the Taliban,” which is really something, driven by the media hysteria about it.
Yeah, I agree with Helga: The real issue should be, what now to do in Afghanistan to work for peace and development? And here, I am quite positive. I believe we have a huge space, because first of all, we don’t need a huge amount of funds or money. Afghanistan is an extremely poor country, and if international aid will go in the right direction, and arrive for the people, with a small investment, in a few years we can have a huge result.
Let’s take the issue that mostly interests the Europeans, should interest them, which is narcotics production. As you know, almost all heroin consumed in Western Europe comes from Afghanistan. And now I’m reading in several newspapers, that the Taliban cannot leave the control of opium poppy cultivation, because they live on it. Which is absolutely wrong! It’s not true! You have very good studies made by the United Nations, not only the Vienna program, but also the Security Council, on the real amount of money that you can skim from opium poppy production, and the figures are the following: the farm gate production last year—we just got these figures a few months ago, from the survey that the United Nations do every year—the farm gate value of all opium poppy in Afghanistan was $350 million—which was much reduced from the peak in 2010 when it was more than $1.4 billion. So the farm gate production is a very small figure. That figure invited the past many governments to consider the idea of buying the crop, and impede the drug trafficking all over Europe. When this $350 million arrives in Europe, in the streets of Berlin, Rome or Paris, the value is about €10 billion. So there’s a huge interest for Europeans to intervene.
My plan at the time, was to phase out all production in 10 years, 5 years, first eliminating production, 20% a year with an extremely small investment; at that time the value of production was much less than today. But if you start, like tomorrow, a plan in Afghanistan to eliminate opium production, we should invest, if we do 20% reduction a year, just $335 million, which, it seems to me, doesn’t mean an important figure.
But you have to have an idea, and you have to have a plan, and you have to have a correct sense of proportion, in the other issues that are involved. Even if the Taliban would appropriate all farm gate production, like a big cartel that buys all opium in the country, the most they can get is $350 million. The budget today, the Afghan government, the leaving government, is around $8 billion. So if the Taliban will establish itself as the government, they will have at their disposal $8 billion to govern a country of 38 million people. All these figures do no impress me! They are not really figures that can impress any international investor. So we have now, the total international aid in Afghanistan, average for the last 10 years, was around, more or less, $7-$8 billion—more or less the entire budget of government.
So now, if we continue to invest in Afghanistan, in a better way than in the past, the figure of international aid we did, we could have really substantial results. And when I say “we,” I say the international community, all, not just U.S.A., and not just the Europeans who have been the major international investors, until now, in Afghanistan.
We have now a big opportunity. We can seize this opportunity and start to make plans, or, we can say, “It’s bad, everything is impossible. Afghanistan continues to be the disaster it has been for the last 40 years,” and then, and then… no more ideas and things to do. OK, thank you.
Arlacchi in Media Blitz Urges Development for Afghanistan, Dialogue with Taliban, Expose Those Behind Terrorism, Drugs
Aug. 27 (EIRNS)—Former Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (1997-2001) Pino Arlacchi has started a media offensive, bringing to the public key issues regarding the necessity of fast economic development in Afghanistan, implementing a drug eradication program, working with the Taliban to accomplish this, and getting to the root of those behind terrorism. Professor Arlacchi, on the faculty of University of Sassari, Italy, discussed these points fully in dialogue at two recent Schiller Institute international webinars on Afghanistan, on July 31 and Aug. 21, and now has brought key ideas into the media from Spain and Italy, to China. Arlacchi called for a development plan as priority in an interview with Sputnik today, while urging for the Italian government to launch an initiative on drugs in an interview with Corriere della Sera on Aug. 26. He has also published two articles in Il Fatto Quotidiano daily, focused on the need to dialogue with the Taliban, and raising questions on the real hand behind the terror attack at the Kabul airport. The following are summaries.
Sputnik: On Aug. 27, the Spanish-language Sputnik Mundo called Pino Arlacchi one of the most renowned experts in the fight against the mafia and drug trafficking. “After suffering a complete failure, the West has lost a voice and vote in Afghanistan. Public opinion seems not to have noticed yet, here they continue to speak as if they had not just suffered a defeat in Afghanistan, but the ball is already on the other side of the field. Everything will now depend on what China and Russia decide in the first place, as well as Pakistan, Iran, India and other Asian nations,” Arlacchi said in the Sputnik Mundo interview.
The Italian sociologist and politician pointed out that “the only way out now is an ambitious recovery plan based on the development of Afghanistan’s internal resources.”
Such a program, in his view, does not have to be expensive. “It is enough to maintain international assistance at the current level, replacing military assistance with development aid. If we do not do it immediately, there is a danger that the Taliban … will not last long in power and the country will once again plunge into total chaos, with disastrous consequences,” warned Arlacchi. (https://mundo.sputniknews.com/20210827/un-experto-occidente-ya-no-tiene-voz-y-voto-en-los-asuntos-de-afganistan—1115447773.html)
Il Fatto Quotidiano: In an article in Il Fatto Quotidiano Aug. 24, Pino Arlacchi called on the Italian government to promote the end of opium business in Afghanistan. Addressing his message to the President and Foreign Minister, Arlacchi recalled his successful experience as head of the UNODC and the renaissance of opium production after the U.S.-NATO invasion. He said the Italian initiative “should move at three levels: a plan for a zero opium production target to be drafted in the next months, the cut-down period, to reduce to a minimum the amount of eradication required at the time of illicit harvesting, in spring-summer next year; the plan must be based on developing alternative crop production to opium, excluding the use of airborne defoliation methods and physical coercion of farmers.
“The preparation and implementation of the opium project must not be diluted within more general policies of agricultural development of the country, and must occur under the supervision of an ad hoc national agency, provided both with its own funds and funds from donor countries.
“Dear President and Dear Minister, I believe that the chances of success of this proposal are high. Do not listen to the media delirium on the issue. Heroin is a big business for European, Turkish, Iranian and Afghan traders (in decreasing order of turnover). Its turnover in Europe is €10 billion.
“There is no business for the commodity growers and not even for the Taliban, who tax opium production at 10%…. If the Taliban government could afford to eliminate opium in 2001, when it was worth 3.7% of GDP, how much easier it is today, with opium at 1.75%,” he wrote.
Il Fatto Quotidiano: In a second article for Il Fatto Quotidiano Aug. 27, Pino Arlacchi wrote that the terrorist attack on the Kabul airport was “overly forecast”—implying that those who most warned about it, might have had something to do with it—but “it does not change the general picture of a complete failure of intelligence, not only about the fall of Kabul and the Taliban victory. The list [of failures] is long, but let us stick to these days: a sort of competition among Western intelligence agencies is ongoing, on who tells the biggest lie about the inevitable proliferation of terrorism under the Taliban.”
On the contrary, Arlacchi wrote. There is the simple reason that it is the endless wars themselves that is producing a proliferation of terrorism. The evidence is that with wars in the Middle East coming to an end, terrorism is ending as well.
In the unpublished version of the article, which EIR has read, Arlacchi provides plenty of data to support his proposition. “Jihadist terror literally exploded after 2001. In 2000, the State Department had identified 13 groups of active Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Middle East, with a total of 32,000 fighters. In 2015, these had become 44 groups, with almost 110,000 fighters. Global attacks had increased ninefold in the same period, 91% of which were against the U.S. or its allies.”
With the withdrawal from Iraq initiated by Trump, terrorism in the Middle East has been diminishing. There were 60% fewer attacks and victims globally, 84% less in the MENA region, according to the Global Terrorism Index. The decline of terrorism has gone on for six years and is more intense: a) where the pullout of U.S. and allied troops is more massive (Iraq: 10,000 deaths in 2016; 644 deaths in 2019;) b) in those countries that are coming out of the orbit of the U.S., such as Pakistan, where from 2,700 civilian victims in 2013, there were 169 victims in 2020; c) in Western Europe, since the start of the Syrian peace conference and the continuation of the 2016 ceasefire, terrorist attacks decreased almost to zero. In 2015-2016, there were 300 victims of attacks, attributed by the media and the governments to the explosion of an irrational clash of civilizations, whereas it is clear today that it was a backlash to French and British bombings in Syria. Since 2017, there has been only one serious attack in Europe, with 11 victims, by a lone right-wing terrorist.
The additional verification is that countries that did not join air raids and did not act militarily on the Syrian territory (Italy, Germany and Scandinavia) have been almost immune from attacks. “The pistol is being unloaded.”
Corriere della Sera: Arlacchi gave an interview to Italy’s newspaper of record, Corriere della Sera, Aug. 26, which is having a big impact. Arlacchi recalls his experience in negotiating with the Taliban in 2000, proving that the Taliban are willing to compromise, and calls on the UN to resume an anti-drug initiative.
“If we give them credit, we can negotiate everything. If, instead—overwhelmed by the emotion of the images we see on TV—we isolate them, it will be a self-fulfilling disaster. Our and their behavior in these first months will be decisive.”
He states: “If I were Europe, I would put drugs at the center of the agenda. We have 1.5 million drug addicts and it is worthwhile for us to stop Afghan heroin. If I were the UN, I would go back to the international scene. The UN left it in 2003 with the Iraq fiasco. Afghanistan, abandoned by the U.S., could mark a big comeback for the UN.” https://www.corriere.it/esteri/21_agosto_26/afghanistan-arlacchi-talebani-osama-galline-vi-spiego-come-trattai-92610452-05e5-11ec-a855-aa98be4fea91.shtml?refresh_ce
Le Figaro Op-Ed on ‘How the West Let Afghanistan Become the Land of Drugs Again’
Aug. 27 (EIRNS)—Le Figaro published on Aug. 24, an op-ed column by Bernard Frahi, former Director of the UNODC Regional Office for Afghanistan and Pakistan (1998-2002) and honorary Comptroller General of the National Police in France. [https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/comment-les-occidentaux-ont-laisse-l-afghanistan-redevenir-le-pays-de-la-drogue-20210824]
Today, Nouvelle Solidarité in Paris reported that the op-ed fully confirms the declarations of Pino Arlacchi, former Director of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), over 1997-2001, to the July 31st Schiller Institute conference on Afghanistan, and adds a straightforward accusation against the British and the Americans for having allowed opium poppy production, once eradicated, to start up all over again. France did not end its anti-drug efforts and calls on all countries to reinforce them now.
The following are excerpts from Mr. Frahi’s text, provided in English by Nouvelle Solidarité:
“September 11, 2001 sounded the death knell for Taliban obscurantism in Afghanistan. However, there was one area where the Taliban had surprised in a positive way: Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s supreme leader, had imposed a total ban on opium poppy cultivation in the territories under their control, i.e. more than 90% of the country and 95% of the area under poppy cultivation. In May 2001, the Taliban had virtually eliminated opium production, bringing it down to 185 tons from 4,600 tons in 1998….
“The trafficking of opium, morphine base, and heroin to Western countries that consume this drug did not begin with the Taliban. It is true that from the time the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996 until the summer of 1999, opium poppy cultivation expanded from about 56,000 to 91,000 hectares and opium production increased from about 2,200 to 4,500 tons. The fact remains that, at the time, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) office in Kabul engaged in a sustained dialogue with the Taliban….
“In September 1999, the Taliban ordered all poppy growers to reduce the size of their crops by one-third…. This resulted in a substantial reduction of 28% in total opium production (from 4,600 tons in 1999 to 3,300 tons in 2000)…. And on July 27, 2000, the authorities in Kandahar prescribed the total elimination of production by spring 2001. With this initiative, the Taliban wanted to obtain implicit international recognition…. In August, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged the Taliban’s success in eliminating opium. This was on the eve of September 11….
“Everything had started well. The Karzai Administration had issued a decree on Jan. 17, 2002 banning the cultivation, production and trafficking of opium and its derivatives. This was due to the determination of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, whom I had alerted in November 2001 to the need for it. But three notable mistakes were made.
“The first was made by the new Afghan authorities…. The Panshjiri were in charge and there was no question of using the Taliban model. In addition, the financial aid from the international community, although already high in 2002, never came to support the land conversion programs for legal crops developed by the UNODC.
“The second mistake was made by the United Kingdom, which was designated as the ‘responsible nation’ to accompany the new Karzai Administration in the fight against drugs. The British had the bad idea of pouring some $60 million into buying opium crops in March 2002…. They gave large sums of money to militia leaders in Nangarahar, Oruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, instructing them to reward farmers who cleared their land in March-April 2002 shortly before the harvest…. The result was disastrous: Farmers favored by these militia leaders received substantial subsidies without eradicating their crops…. Farmers converted their fields from a single crop of wheat in 2002 to opium poppy in 2003.
“The third mistake was made by the United States. The Pentagon, focused exclusively on the fight against terrorism, refused, until 2005, to intervene against opium cultivation and the notorious traffickers…. The production increased in 2021 to 6,300 tons on cultivated area of 224,000 hectares (against 90,000 in 1999). The Afghan opium production represents today 85% of the world production….
“Faced with such a disaster, what to do? On Aug. 17, 2021, the Taliban spokesman promised a drug-free Afghanistan, as in 2001, asking for international help for the development of alternative crops. Two measures are needed. First, take the Taliban at their word and challenge them to impose a total ban on opium cultivation…. Second, complementing livelihood support measures in Afghanistan’s agricultural sector and preventing displacement of opium poppy cultivation with strategies to neutralize the war economy, both the cause and effect of the chronic conflict that plagues the country.
“France already has a tool to fight the trafficking of opium. The Paris Pact initiative was established in 2003 and has been continuously pursued by the UNODC with the support of France. This regional cooperation program will benefit from being reinvigorated to stem the flow of drugs from Afghanistan.”
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